21. Question 4: Ruth and Stella were sisters. They owned a house as joint tenants with right to survivorship. Ruth sold her half interest to Roy. Thereafter, Stella died, and Roy claimed the entire property by survivorship. Was he entitled to it?
Answer: Roy claims the whole property after Ruth sold her share to her. Ruth’s sister died and she owned the house with her. Under the rule of survivorship when a co-owner of a property dies, the other co-owner takes legal possession of the property (Eddington, 2014). Therefore, Roy can claim survivorship on behalf of the Ruth who sold her rights to her.
21: Question 6: In 1971, Harry Gordon turned over $40,000 to his son Murray Gordon. Murray opened two $20,000 custodial bank accounts under the Uniform Gift to Minors Act for his minor children, Eden and Alexander. Murray was listed as the custodian of both accounts. On January 9, 1976, both accounts were closed, and single bank check representing the principle of the accounts was drawn to the order of Harry Gordon. In April 1976, Murray and his wife, Joan entered into a separation agreement and were later divorced. Thereafter, Joan, on behalf of her children, Eden and Alexander, brought suit against Murray to receive the funds withdrawn in January 1976, contending that the deposits in both accounts were irrevocable gifts. Murray contended that the money was his father’s and that it was never intended as a gift but was merely a means of avoiding taxes. Decide. [Gordon v. Gordon, 419 N.Y.S.2d 684 (App. Div.)]
Answer: In this case, Joan sued her ex-husband Murray for the gifts given to her sons by their father and later withdrawn by the grandfather who had given the money to Murray. The Uniform Gift to Minors Act requires the custodians to deal with the gifts on behalf of the beneficiary (Eddington, 2014). However, the transfer is irrevocable. Because Murray was the custodian, he had the right to use the money on behalf of the children, but it was returned to the grandfather. This is wrong because the custodian had all the right over it – it was irrevocable.
21 – Question 7: New York’s Banking law provides that a presumption arises that a joint tenancy has been created when a bank account is opened in the names of two persons “payable to either or the survivor.” While he was still single, Richard Coddington opened a savings account with his mother Amelia. The signature card they signed stated that the account was owned by them as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. No statement as to survivorship was made on the passbook. Richard later married Margaret. On Richard’s death, Margaret claimed a share on the passbook account on the ground that it was not held in joint tenancy because the passbook did not contain words of survivorship and because the statutory presumption of a joint tenancy was overcome by the fact that Richard had withdrawn substantial sums from the account during his life. Decide. [Coddington v. Coddington, 391 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Sup.Ct. App. Div.)]
Answer: Richard opened an account jointly with her mother before marrying. After marrying and later dying, his wife claims a share to his passbook. New York’s banking laws provides a presumption of joint tenancy. Survivorship law states that when a person dies, his or her share of tenancy passes to the survivor. Therefore, upon Richard’s death the passbook goes to her mother.
21: Question 10: Schroeder parked his car in a parking lot operated by Allright, Inc., On the parking stub given him was printed in large, heavy type that the lot closed at 6:00 P.M. Under this information, printed in smaller, lighter, type was a provision limiting the liability of Allright for theft or loss. A large sign at the lot stated that after 6:00 P.M. patrons could obtain their car keys at another location.
Schroeder’s car was stolen from the lot sometime after the 6:00 P.M. closing, and he sued Allright for damages. Allright defended on the basis of the limitation-of-liability provision contained in the parking stub and the notice given Schroeder that the lot closed at 6:00 P.M. Decide. [Allright, Inc. v. Schroeder, 551 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Civ.App.)]
Answer: Schroeder’s car parked in the premises of Allright, Inc. The owner claims for damages. The law on negligence states that people should pay for damages if they act negligently (Vetter, 1999). However, some clauses may be provided to limit liability, but all parties should be made aware of the liability. The clause limiting liability in the parking stub was written in small letters and Allright did not make Schroeder aware of the liability clause. So Schroeder had the right to sue for damages.
22 – Question 8: Richard Schewe and others placed personal property in a building occupied by Winnebago County Fair Association, Inc. Prior to placing their property in the building, they signed a “Storage Rental Agreement” prepared by the County Fair Association, which stated: “No liability exists for damage or loss to the stored equipment from perils of fire…” The property was destroyed by fire. Suit was against the County Fair Association to recover damages for the losses on the theory of negligence of a warehouse. The County Fair Association claimed that the language in the storage agreement relieved it of all liability. [Allstate Ins. Co. v. Winnebago County Fair Ass’n Inc., 475 N.E.2d 230 (III.App.)]
Answer: Richard Schewe and others are suing for damages after their property was burned by fire in the premises of Winnebago County Fair Association, Inc. An agreement limiting liability had been signed by the two parties. The uniform commercial code states that warehousemen should not make contracts that exempt them from liability caused by negligence. However, the cause of fire is not stated, and the plaintiffs fail to show how the defendant acted negligently. So the case should be dismissed.
22: Question 9: Buffett sent a violin to Strotokowsky by International Parcel Service (IPS), a common carrier. Buffet declared the value of the parcel at $500 on the pick-up receipt given him by the IPS driver. The receipt also state: “Unless a greater value is declares and agrees that the released value of each package covered by this receipt is $100.00, which is reasonable value under the circumstance surrounding the transportation”. When Strotokowsky did not receive the parcel, Buffett sued IPS for the full retail value of the violin- $2,000. IPS’s defense was that it was liable for just $100. Decide.
Answer: Strotokowsky sues International Parcel Service for $2,000. This is the retail price of his parcel that got lost. Under contract law, any party can sue for damages from the other party if he or she breaches the contract. There was an implied contract of delivering the parcel, whose price or consideration was paid. The IPS should pay a value of $500 which was declared by Strotokowsky, not $100 which is paid if there was no value declared according to receipt.
22: Question 11: Garrett and his wife checked into the St. louis Airport North Holiday Inn on March 29, taking advantage of the hotel’s “Park and Fly” package, which provide on night of lodging to individuals, provided a shuttle service to Lambert International Airport, and allowed individuals to keep a vehicle on the hotel’s parking lot for up to two weeks. When the Garretts returned from their vacation on April 17, this discovered that their vehicle was stolen. They sued the hotel, contending that a special relationship of an innkeeper and guest was created by the “Park and Fly” marketing package, and that the hotels knowledge of criminal activity on its parking lot created a duty to warn the Garretts, which it failed to do. What status did the Garretts have with the hotel regarding the protection of their vehicle after boarding the plane on their vacation trip? Was there a bailment of the vehicle under the “Park and Fly” marketing package? [Garrett v. IMPAC Hotels Inc., 87 S.W.3d 870 (Mo. App.)]
Answer: Garretts left their car in St. louis Airport North Holiday Inn, relying on the company’s Park and Fly package which allows them to leave their car in the Hotel’s parking area for up to 2 weeks. There was an implied duty of care because the hotel knew. In the contract, the hotel had duty of care over the car. So Garrettes had the right to sue for damages.
23: Question 3: Smythe wrote to Lasco Dealers inquiring about the price of a certain freezer. Lasco wrote her a letter, signed by its credit manager, stating that Smythe could purchase the freezer in question during the next 30 days for $400. Smythe wrote back the next day ordering a freezer at that price. Lasco received Smythe’s letter the following day, but Lasco wrote a response letter stating that it had changed the price to $450. Smyth claims that Lasco could not change its price. Is she correct?
Answer: Lasco dealers changed the price of their goods after Smythe showed intention to buy. The initial price of $400 was an offer to sale because it was given specifically to him and signed by the manager of the store. The contract would materialize upon acceptance by Freezer. Therefore, Freezer is correct when she says that the price would not be changed because a contract was made upon acceptance, and changing price would be a breach of the contract.
23: Question 6: Valley Trout Farms ordered fish food form Rangen. Both parties were merchants. The invoice that was sent with the order stated that a specified charge- a percentage common in the industry- would be added to any unpaid bills. Valley Trout Farms did not pay for the food and did not make any objection to the late charge stated in the invoice. When sued by Rangen, Valley Trout Farms claimed that it had never agreed to the late charge and therefore was not required to pay it. Is Valley Trout Farms correct? [Range, Inc. v Valley Trout Farms, Inc., 658 P.2d 955 (Idaho)]
Answer: Valley Trout Farms ordered food and it was sent to them alongside an invoice that stated that an additional charge would be provided for late payment. The merchants did not pay for the food. The law of contract suggests that implied acceptance is valid. When the Valley Trout Farms used the food, they were implying that they accepted the terms of the contract, including the additional payment. Therefore, Valley Trout Farms is not true to say that they were not required to pay for the charge.
23: Question 10: Fastner Corp. sent a letter to Renzo Box Co. that was signed by Ronald Lee, Fastener’s sales manager, and read as follows: “We hereby offer you 200 type #14 Fasteners bolts at $5 per bolt./ This off will be irrevocable for ten days.” On the fifth day, Fastener informed Renzo it was revoking the offer, alleging that there was no consideration for the offer. Could Fastener revoke? Explain.
Answer: The letter sent by Fastner Corp to Renzo Box C.o. was signed by the sales manager. It stated that the offer provided is irrevocable for ten days, but it was revoked in 5 days. There was no acceptance of the offer from Renzo because he did not reply to Fastner. According to contract law, a contract is valid if there is a n acceptance to the offer. There was no contract in this case because Renzo did not accept either through direct or implied means. Silence is not acceptance. Therefore, Fastner could revoke.
