Introduction
War and the philosophy of war are dynamic; hence difficult to define. Various philosophers have developed different thoughts and models regarding the philosophy of war. Generally, Eastern philosophers use approaches that are different from those of Western philosophers. One of the most well-known Western philosophers of war is Carl von Clausewitz and one of the most prominent Eastern philosophers is Sun Tzu. Clausewitz was a Prussian officer who lived in the 18th and early 19th century while Sun Tzu was a well-known military advisor to the Chinese mobility in 500 B.C. Sun Tzu’s military thought is based on the philosophy of elegance and simplicity. On the other hand, Clausewitz’s philosophic approach to war is based on plain brutality.[1]
Sun Tzu wrote “the art of war” while Clausewitz wrote “on war”. These classical studies on war have become important pillars for the modern strategies in military.[2] They define the fundamental principles and insights on human behaviour regarding warfare and the philosophy of war. These fundamental principles and insights are applicable universally. This essay discusses the similarities and differences between Sun Tzu and Clausewitz in terms of the fundamental principles and insights on human behaviour towards warfare. The essay attempts to compare and contrast the thoughts of the two philosophers on war. It proposes that Sun Tzu’s thought and Clausewitz’s thought do not have significant differences in relation to culture, time, and geographic conditions. Their conclusions did not also show significant differences. However, the two philosophers differed in terms of emphasis and substance because they came from different military backgrounds.
Differences between the strategic thoughts Sun Tzu and Clausewitz
The differences between Sun Tzu’s and Clausewitz’s thoughts on war can be observed in their writings. Although Clausewitz and Sun Tzu lived in different geographical locations of the world, they addressed problems that are universal in nature – the problems of war. However, the two philosophers of war provide different thoughts on how to solve such problems. In “The Art of War” Sun Tzu presents what seems to be a clear vision, profound insight and eternal freshness in war. On the other hand, Clausewitz wrote the book “on war” and emphasized a logical ideal and absolute approach to war.[3] The two writings are considered to be useful and applicable in both military studies and military activities in the modern military environment. However, the difference in methodology and style makes Sun Tzu’s writings more widely read than Clausewitz writings. Clausewitz’s methodology and style is not easy to follow because it is complex while Sun Tzu’s methodology is easier to follow because it is simpler.[4]
The differences in style and methodology of Clausewitz’s and Sun Tzu’s writings on war demonstrate different perspectives on strategic thought of the two philosophers of war. Sun Tzu’s book “The Art of War” is written in less than hundred pages in English translation. This briefness presents the strategic thought of Sun Tzu in a severe succinctness.[5] On the other hand, “On War” written by Clausewitz is turgid and obscure, with about six hundred pages in English language.[6] Sun Tzu briefly explains the essence of wisdom in the conduct of war. On war provides a step-by-step logically constructed explanation of a reasoning process in the conduct of war.[7] On the other hand, Sun Tzu provides conclusions without explaining clearly how his thoughts are arrived at in strategic conduct of war. Clausewitz seemingly provides creative and original insights or strategic thoughts on the nature of war.[8] He considers certain factors in the conduct of war.
Clausewitz and Sun Tzu approach the same issue from different perspectives. In both cases, the ultimate goal is to win the war; but how to achieve that brings a difference between the two authors. Sun Tzu argues that the best policy to be considered by a political or military leader is to take a state intact and to subdue the enemy without fighting.[9] While Clausewitz agrees that it is better to win the war without fighting, he also contends that this is rarely possible. The disagreements between Clausewitz and Sun Tzu on certain issues of war are based on their perceived emphasis, not substance.[10]
The basic difference between Sun Tzu’s and Clausewitz’s strategic thoughts on war is based on the main arguments on their books. The central idea of Sun Tzu is that weapons are disastrous instruments in military strategy.[11] Sun Tzu suggests that weapons should only be used when there is no alternative. According to Sun Tzu, the enemy should be subdued without fighting.[12] This presents the idea of pinnacle of skill in Sun Tzu’s strategic thought on war. In other words, Sun Tzu expects military officers to demonstrate high skill in non-weaponry fight against the enemy. The soldier and the lobbyist in Sun Tzu’s strategic thought benefit from skillful approach to war. According to Sun Tzu, engagement in war should always be guided by the need to achieve a given political objective. In order to achieve the objective, Tzu argues that the means should be proportionate and measured as much as possible. He argues that there is no need to deploy a large number of soldiers while it is possible to achieve the aim in a less far-reaching and/or indirect manner (Pars, 2013).
Clausewitz argues that the best way to win in war is to use massive force in order to combat the frictions of the enemy. In this case, friction refers to suffering, fear, confusion and exhaustion.[13] This requires the soldiers first to establish the center of gravity from where the conflict arises and develop a decisive clash of masses to decrease the impact of opposing forces from the enemy. Clausewitz’s thought was applied in First World War in Europe whereby the soldiers used brutality and assault.[14] Brutal forces often attack the strong points of the enemy, causing bloody effects on both sides of the fighting forces. Unlike Sun Tzu who advocates for attacking the enemy’s strategy without using force, Clausewitz calls for the destruction and occupation of the enemy’s territory.
While proposing that war is won not necessarily through fighting, Sun Tzu suggests diplomatic strategies to win war. On pages 77-78 of his book, The art of War, Sun Tzu argues that the plans of the enemy should be attacked from their inception. According to him, diplomatic negotiations, bargains, and deception can be used to win war. Sun Tzu also recommends that the alliances of the enemy should be disrupted as a strategic mechanism of winning war. Sun Tzu argues that disrupting the enemy’s alliances deprives him of external support; hence abandoning his plans to engage in war. It may also lead to the enemy’s defeat in isolation. On the other hand, Clausewitz’s thoughts as shown in his writing demonstrate that he supports the act of waging war itself, not the workings of diplomacy before, during or after war.[15] Clausewitz’s strategic thoughts on war seem to converge at a point where diplomacy has failed and fighting has become an inevitable option.
Sun Tzu considers deception as a key element in enhancing success in war. He provides guiding principles of deception as part of valid psychological insights. One of the principles is to present oneself as feign and inactive to the enemy when in reality you are capable and active.[16] A military person may also make himself to appear far away when in reality he is near. Furthermore, a military person may pretend to be inferior in order to encourage arrogance from the enemy.[17] In this regard, Sun Tzu is considered to be sensitive in his strategic thought on psychological factors that enable the military to manipulate the enemy’s perceptions.[18] On the other hand, Clausewitz explains the use of deception from a lower level where its effect is less effective and uncertain.
Another perspective from which the strategic thoughts of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu differ is the level in which war is conducted. Sun Tzu suggests that war should be conducted from the highest strategic level while Clausewitz recommends that war should be conducted from the lowest strategic level – the operational level. Clausewitz is not concerned with the diplomatic or economic environments in which warfare takes place, which are apparently the most influential environments in the highest strategic level of the military or politics. According to Clausewitz, the involvement of a military leader in war is a given phenomenon; in which he strives to attain victory in the battlefield.[19]
Sun Tzu also includes the logistical and economic dimensions of war in his strategic thoughts while Clausewitz ignores such dimensions.[20] According to Sun Tzu, logistics and economics are linked to strategy and war. Clausewitz confines his discussions on war to the battlefield, ignoring the wider dimensions that are recognised by Sun Tzu. Clausewitz does not even bother to think about how guns and other weapons are made in preparation of war; he only focuses on how such guns and weapons are used on the battlefield; whether the weapons are effective and ready for use during the real battle of war.[21] Clausewitz also comments that once hostilities commence, politics set in. He distinguishes the preparations for war from combat and operations. On the other hand, Sun Tzu sees diplomatic, political and logistical preparations of war as well as combat and operations as integral elements of the same activity.[22]
Sun Tzu’s strategic thought focuses on the end, while Clausewitz’s strategic thought concentrates on the means to an end. In this case, Sun Tzu calls for victory in whichever way possible while Clausewitz calls for the destruction of the enemy’s strong point in order to achieve victory. The strategic thought of Sun Tzu is winning, while the strategic thought of Clausewitz is to destroy the enemy in order to win. According to Sun Tzu, a soldier may win without destroying the enemy, but according to Clausewitz a soldier should destroy the enemy in order to win. Sun Tzu requires that a winning soldier uses a set of principles such as surprise, deception, fluidity, and intelligence. On the other hand, Clausewitz dismisses the aspect of deception and argues that it should only be used as a strategy of the last resort.[23] This shows that the strategy of last resort for Sun Tzu is weaponry and the strategy of last resort for Clausewitz is deception.
As noted earlier, Sun Tzu’s strategic thought focuses on any whichever means possible to win the war. This shows that Sun Tzu supports the use of unconventional means to win war, including deception.[24] Clausewitz opposed the use of unconventional operations in order to win in war. The soldiers simply have to sacrifice in order to win the war. They should be ready to die fighting if that is what it takes to win the war. On the other hand, Sun Tzu suggests that the soldiers do not have to sacrifice in order to win the war. According to Tzu, a military can win the war without fighting the enemy, risking his life or sacrificing himself in any other way.[25] Tzu sees benefits in war without bloody sacrifice. He contends that fighting only causes bitterness, grudges, animosity and scars.[26] Tzu therefore prefers a strategy without fighting. He considers the use of force as costly and time consuming. Peace is achieved quickly and at low cost if force and bloodshed is not involved.[27]
Another strategy that makes a big difference between Clausewitz’s and Sun Tzu’s strategic thoughts is wisdom. According to Tzu, wisdom is a key element of winning in war. In this case, wisdom involves keeping the enemy waiting and guessing about one’s strategic move. This keeps the enemy off-balance and making him to react always instead of acting. On the other hand, Clausewitz requires that soldiers should face the enemy head-on and confront him. This makes the enemy to predict the soldiers’ move and act. Tzu’s strategic thought advocates for well-calculated and measured approach rather than a planned fight without measurable outcomes. Before one takes a military stand in war, he/she should weigh the benefits and costs of such an action. Tzu considers all available options to win the war while Clausewitz considers only using force to destroy the enemy and occupy his territory.[28] Without a workable plan, such a coercive approach may not be successful. It is highly risky and requires a substantial amount of sacrifice from those who engage in the war.
Although both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu recognise the importance of rational decision making and calculations in the conduct of war, Clausewitz seems more concerned with the difficulties of overreliance on rational calculus.[29] He recognizes the intervention of unexpected forces such as chance, friction, unreliable intelligence and complexity. Clausewitz presents limited expectations of benefits of rational calculations in war (Handel, 1991). In this regard, Clausewitz’s strategic thought on rational calculations of war is more sophisticated and realistic than sun Tzu.
While Sun Tzu devotes his strategic attention on the environment where war occurs as he does the battle itself, Clausewitz provides a narrower definition of war. Clausewitz emphasizes on the centrality of combat over political preparations. He assumes that logistical and economic environments would take care of themselves. He also contends that economic factors may be overridden by success on the battlefield. Handel (1991) suggests that these assumptions by Clausewitz are dangerous today because scientific discoveries; production and distribution of food and fuel; and technological innovation are becoming as important as one’s performance on the battlefield.[30] Sun Tzu’s strategic thoughts are more relevant for the analysis of strategy and war in the current military environment because they are focused on a comprehensive framework that includes political and economic environment.
Similarities between the strategic thoughts Sun Tzu and Clausewitz
Clausewitz and Sun Tzu also present some similarities in their strategic thoughts on war. These similarities are shown mainly by the fundamental principles and insights demonstrated by the two philosophers of war regarding to human behaviour towards strategy of war. Both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu employ an ideal-type approach to war. Fundamentally, sun Tzu and Clausewitz agree consider war as an art not a science. This methodological assumption brings the two leaders to the conclusion that military problems have potentially correct solutions (Handle, 1991). According to Clausewitz and Sun Tzu such solutions are derived from the imagination, intuition and creativity of the military leader. The two philosophers of war also agree that the lasting complexities of war cause difficulties in the formulation of positive theories even when certain laws and maxims are applied. Clausewitz and Sun Tzu reach a final conclusion that there are no fixed rules in the art of war. Both agree that success of the military in war depends on the talent and artistic intuition of the military leader.[31] Clausewitz and Sun Tzu also provide a similar same argument – that experience and innate ability work together to enhance the success of a military leader in war.[32] They also provide a uniform proposition that their respective writings have limited value; because they only give military participants the wisdom, but not the concrete advice on how to apply their insights in military environment.[33] Tzu and Clausewitz warn their readers that success in war does not rely on mastery of theory but on its application.[34] Accordingly, application of theory relies on the intuition of the military leader or commander.
Another similarity between the strategic thoughts of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz is that they both recognize the primacy of politics in conduct of war. Like Sun Tzu, Clausewitz views the state as a key player in the art of war.[35] Both leaders argue that military engagements have the sole purpose of promoting the interests of the state rather than personal interests of military leaders. They both agree that war is neither a ritual nor an activity of purpose. Clausewitz and Sun Tzu argue that soldiers engage in war to achieve political objectives.[36] Those who engage in war put aside their personal ambitions and interests, and fight to serve their political leaders.[37] Sun Tzu and Clausewitz also provide that war is a rational activity and a political activity as understood in the modern world. Since the decision to engage in war is political, it should be made by political leaders instead of military leaders. However, Clausewitz and Sun Tzu also hold that there are exceptional circumstances when military commander overrules political orders.
Clausewitz and Sun Tzu also recommend that rational calculus should be used to determine correlations of means and ends; hence achieving the political objectives of war. The two philosophers of war contend that calculation is necessary to win in war, and that the pure rational decision making model is applicable in military engagements. Generally, Sun Tzu and Clausewitz consider war as a rational activity that involves careful and continuous correlation between ends and means.[38] Similarly, the two authors recognise the importance of other non-rational factors such as motivation, intuition and morale.
In conclusion, it may be concluded that Clausewitz and Sun Tzu differ in terms of their strategic thoughts on how war should be approached and conducted, but arrive at similar conclusions. Clausewitz provides a complex writing on war while Sun Tzu makes his writing simpler. In terms of differences, Clausewitz and Sun Tzu mainly differ on the use of force and deception in war. Clausewitz argues that the success of war solely depends on the use of force and bloodshed while Sun Tzu argues that success on war depends on other strategic approaches apart from using force and bloodshed. Some of the strategies considered by Sun Tzu include deception, diplomatic negotiation, and bargains. According to Sun Tzu, diplomacy is necessary to win in war. Clausewitz suggests that diplomacy and deception may only be used at the lower military levels (operational levels) where their effects in war are ineffective. In terms of similarities, Clausewitz and Sun Tzu support the primacy of politics in war. It may be concluded that Sun Tzu’s strategic thoughts are more relevant for the analysis of strategy and war in the current military environment because they are focused on a comprehensive framework that includes political and economic environment.
Endnotes
[1] Zapotoczny, W.S. 2006. Sun Tzu Compared to Clausewitz. Accessed March 31, 2013 from http://www.wzaponline.com/
[2] Pars, M. 2013. “Six strategy lessons from Clausewitz and Sun Tzu.” Journal of Public affairs, 1-6
[3] Handel, M.I. 2001. Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought. London: Franc Cass.
[4] Handel, M.I. 1991. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: The art of war and On Way Compared. Professional Readings in Military strategy, 2: 1-82.
[5] Pars, M. 2013. “Six strategy lessons from Clausewitz and Sun Tzu.” Journal of Public affairs, 1-6
[6] Hart, B.H.L. 1967. Strategy: The Indirect Approach. London: Faber and Faber.
[7] Handel, M.I. 1991. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: The art of war and On Way Compared. Professional Readings in Military strategy, 2: 1-82.
[8] Handel, M.I. 1991. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: The art of war and On Way Compared. Professional Readings in Military strategy, 2: 1-82.
[9] Handel, M.I. 1991. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: The art of war and On Way Compared. Professional Readings in Military strategy, 2: 1-82.
[10] Zapotoczny, W. 2006. Sun Tzu Compared to Clausewitz. Accessed March 31, 2013 from http://www.wzaponline.com/
[11] Pars, M. 2013. “Six strategy lessons from Clausewitz and Sun Tzu.” Journal of Public affairs, 1-6
[12] Tzu, S. 1963.The Art of War. trans. Samuel B. Griffith. London: Oxford University Press.
[13] Herberg-Rothe, A. 2011. Speaking Freely: Clausewitz and Sun Tzu after the neo-cons. Asia Times, September 14, 2011.
[14] Handel, M.I. 1991. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: The art of war and On Way Compared. Professional Readings in Military strategy, 2: 1-82.
[15] Handel, M.I. 1991. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: The art of war and On Way Compared. Professional Readings in Military strategy, 2: 1-82.
[16] Herberg-Rothe, A. 2011. Speaking Freely: Clausewitz and Sun Tzu after the neo-cons. Asia Times, September 14, 2011.
[17] Zapotoczny, W. 2006. Sun Tzu Compared to Clausewitz. Accessed March 31, 2013 from http://www.wzaponline.com/
[18] Pars, M. 2013. “Six strategy lessons from Clausewitz and Sun Tzu.” Journal of Public affairs, 1-6
[19] Clausewitz, C.V. 2002.On War. ed. and trans. Michael Howard. New York: Oxford University Press.
[20] Zapotoczny, W. 2006. Sun Tzu Compared to Clausewitz. Accessed March 31, 2013 from http://www.wzaponline.com/
[21] Handel, M.I. 1991. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: The art of war and On Way Compared. Professional Readings in Military strategy, 2: 1-82.
[22] Pars, M. 2013. “Six strategy lessons from Clausewitz and Sun Tzu.” Journal of Public affairs, 1-6
[23] Zapotoczny, W. 2006. Sun Tzu Compared to Clausewitz. Accessed March 31, 2013 from http://www.wzaponline.com/
[24] Pars, M. 2013. “Six strategy lessons from Clausewitz and Sun Tzu.” Journal of Public affairs, 1-6
[25] Hart, B.H.L. 1967. Strategy: The Indirect Approach. London: Faber and Faber.
[26] Hart, B.H.L. 1967. Strategy: The Indirect Approach. London: Faber and Faber.
[27] Handel, M.I. 1991. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: The art of war and On Way Compared. Professional Readings in Military strategy, 2: 1-82.
[28] Clausewitz, C.V. 2002.On War. ed. and trans. Michael Howard. New York: Oxford University Press.
[29] Handel, M.I. 1991. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: The art of war and On Way Compared. Professional Readings in Military strategy, 2: 1-82.
[30] Zapotoczny, W. 2006. Sun Tzu Compared to Clausewitz. Accessed March 31, 2013 from http://www.wzaponline.com/
[31] Handel, M.I. 1991. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: The art of war and On Way Compared. Professional Readings in Military strategy, 2: 1-82.
[32] Strachan, H. 2005. “The Lost Meaning of Strategy” Survival, 47(3): 33-54.
[33] Handel, M.I. 2001. Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought. London: Franc Cass.
[34] Zapotoczny, W.S. 2006. Sun Tzu Compared to Clausewitz. Accessed March 31, 2013 from http://www.wzaponline.com/
[35] Clausewitz, C.V. 2002.On War. ed. and trans. Michael Howard. New York: Oxford University Press
[36] Herberg-Rothe, A. 2011. Speaking Freely: Clausewitz and Sun Tzu after the neo-cons. Asia Times, September 14, 2011.
[37] Pars, M. 2013. “Six strategy lessons from Clausewitz and Sun Tzu.” Journal of Public affairs, 1-6
[38] Strachan, H. 2005. “The Lost Meaning of Strategy” Survival, 47(3): 33-54.
